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Many reports have described that a survival judgment task that requires participants to
judge words according to their relevance to a survival situation can engender better recall
than that obtained in other judgment tasks such as semantic or self-judgment tasks.
We investigated whether memory enhancement related to the survival judgment task is
elicited or not in subclinically depressed participants. Based on the BDI score, participants
were classiﬁed as either depressed or non-depressed participants.Then 20 depressed par-
ticipants and 24 non-depressed participants performed a survival judgment task and an
autobiographical recall task. Results showed memory enhancement related to the survival
judgment task in both depressed and non-depressed participants, but showed lower mem-
ory enhancement related to the survival judgment task in depressed participants than in
non-depressed participants. These results suggest that the survival judgment task beneﬁt
is a robust phenomenon. Moreover, that beneﬁt was reduced by depressed emotion. The
combination hypothesis better explains the mechanism of memory enhancement related
to the survival judgment task than the functional, emotional, and arousal or congruency
hypothesis does.
Keywords: depression, adaptive memory, survival judgment task, combination hypothesis, subclinical
INTRODUCTION
DEPRESSED MOOD AND MEMORY PERFORMANCE
Depressed mood can change a way we feel and can change our
memory performance (Burt et al., 1995; Veiel, 1997). Three types
of memory biases for depressed people have been frequently
reported. A ﬁrst memory bias is a mood congruent memory bias
(e.g., Bower, 1981; Blaney, 1986). The mood congruent memory
bias is that depressed participants have a tendency to recall nega-
tive emotional information, especially depression-relevant mate-
rials. A second memory bias is overgenerality of autobiographical
memory (e.g.,Williams et al., 2007). This bias is that depressedpar-
ticipants have a tendency to recall categories of repeated events or
impair retrieval of memories of speciﬁc autobiographical events.
A third memory bias is (general) memory deﬁcits (e.g., Austin
et al., 2001; Burt et al., 1995). For example, memory performance
in depressed participants is worse than that in non-depressed par-
ticipants. We focused on the memory deﬁcits in this study. The
reasons why we focused on memory deﬁcit in depressed partici-
pants were (1) numerous studies reported the memory deﬁcits in
depressed people (e.g., Burt et al., 1995; Veiel, 1997; Austin et al.,
2001), (2) some studies showed an association between severities
of depressed mood and memory impairments (e.g., McDermott
and Ebmeier, 2009; Sheline et al., 2006), (3) memory deﬁcit would
affects daily activity (e.g., memory deﬁcits may cause forgetting to
take medicine).
Many previous studies showed that depressed participants had
memory deﬁcits, especially episodic memory domain. Results of
previous studies have shown that depressed participants show
lower memory performance than non-depressed participants do
in various memory tests with both verbal and visual stimuli
(Austin et al., 2001; Fossati et al., 2002; Ilsley et al., 1995). Human
memory performance can improve when we use effective encod-
ing strategies such as a semantic judgment task (e.g., Does this
word mean the same as XXX?; Craik and Lockhart, 1972) or a
self-referent task (e.g., Does this word describe you?; Rogers et al.,
1977). Even if using the semantic judgment task and the self-
referent judgment task, the memory performance of depressed
participants has been shown to be lower than that of non-
depressed participants (Breslow et al., 1981; Derry and Kuiper,
1981; Kuiper and Derry, 1982; Weingartner et al., 1981, 1982).
Results of previous studies have shown that the semantic judg-
ment task and the self-referent judgment task are facilitated by an
elaboration process, which is the process of adding to the informa-
tion (Craik and Tulving, 1975; Klein and Kihlstrom, 1986). Based
on these results, depressed individuals were unable to conduct an
elaboration process of a certain type (Williams et al., 1997). Con-
sequently,memory performance in depressed participants is lower
than that in non-depressed participants.
SURVIVAL JUDGMENT TASK AND MEMORY PERFORMANCE
Nairne et al. (2007) recently reported that the survival judgment
task was the most effective encoding strategy. In the survival judg-
ment task, participants were asked to judge whether or not the
presented information was necessary for a survival situation. In
this case, the participants were instructed to imagine a survival
situation inwhich they were stranded in the grasslands of a foreign
land with no basic survival materials. The memory performance
of the survival judgment task was higher than that for either a
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semantic judgment task or a self-referent judgment task (Nairne
et al., 2007, 2008). For example, Nairne et al. (2007) directly
compared memory performance in the survival judgment task,
a moving judgment task, a pleasantness judgment task, and a self-
referent judgment task. In the moving judgment task, participants
judged whether or not the presented information was necessary
for a moving situation. In the pleasantness judgment task, they
judged whether or not the presented information was pleasant. In
the self-reference judgment task, they were asked to judge how eas-
ily the word brings tomind an important personal experience. The
result showed that thememory performance obtained through the
survival judgment task was higher than that obtained using other
judgment tasks.
Many researchers were able to replicate this memory enhance-
ment by the survival judgment task (Kang et al., 2008; Nairne and
Pandeirada, 2008; Nairne et al., 2008, 2009; Otgaar and Smeets,
2010; Otgaar et al., 2010; Weinstein et al., 2008). Results of the
earlier studies suggested that the experimental design (within-
subjects or between-subjects; Nairne et al., 2007; Nairne and
Pandeirada, 2008; Weinstein et al., 2008), the test conditions (free
recall or recognition;Nairne et al., 2007, 2008; Kang et al., 2008), or
a stimulus of some type (word or picture; Otgaar et al., 2010) does
not inﬂuence this effect. Thus, the memory enhancement of the
survival judgment task would be a robust memory phenomenon.
EXPLANATORY HYPOTHESES FOR MEMORY ENHANCEMENT RELATED
TO THE SURVIVAL JUDGMENT TASK
There are some hypotheses which explain the memory enhance-
ment of the survival judgment tasks. In this section, we focused
on two main hypotheses (functional hypothesis and combina-
tion hypothesis). The beneﬁt of the survival judgment task was
mainly interpreted by a functional hypothesis. The functional
hypothesis assumed that our memory was shaped and evolved to
improve directly or indirectly the opportunity of survival (Jacob,
1977; Tooby and Cosmides, 1992, 2005; Nairne, 2005). Thus,
our memory systems are biased or tuned to remember ﬁtness
(survival)-related information (Klein et al., 2002; Nairne, 2005).
In this hypothesis, thinking a survival situation and judging pre-
sented information would improve the opportunity to survive.
Therefore, memory performance in the survival judgment task
is higher than that in the other tasks (e.g., pleasantness judgment
task, self-referent judgment task, ormoving judgment task;Nairne
et al., 2007). This hypothesis assumed that thinking about the sur-
vival situation would tap into special cognitive adaptation or a
kind of memory module which is specialized for remember and
processing survival-related information (Nairne et al., 2007). The
functional hypothesis explained that thememory enhancement of
the survival judgment task would occur when participants think
about the survival situation.
Recently, Nouchi (2011a,b) proposed a combination hypoth-
esis that accounts for the beneﬁt of the survival judgment task.
The combination hypothesis is a combination of the functional
perspective (Klein et al., 2002; Nairne, 2005) and elaboration per-
spective (Anderson andReder, 1979). The combination hypothesis
accepts the concept of the functional perspective of memory. Our
human memory tends to remember ﬁtness-related information
(Klein et al., 2002; Nairne, 2005). Moreover, our memory perfor-
mance can be better when people conduct elaboration processes
(Anderson and Reder, 1979). In this case, the elaboration is the
process of adding to the information (e.g., a logical inference, an
illustration or a detail image; Gagne, 1985). Memory performance
is determined by the number and type of elaboration performed
on the information (Anderson and Reder, 1979). Anderson and
Reder (1979) reported that the elaboration capability is dependent
on participants’ experiences (aging) and abilities of other types
(e.g., imagery ability). Nouchi (2011b) asserted that the number
and type of elaboration would be facilitated during participants’
consideration of whether or not the presented items might be
useful in the survival situation. Thereby, imagining the survival
situation would facilitate the conduct of the elaboration process,
which would not occur in the other encoding tasks. The combina-
tion hypothesis assumed that the beneﬁcial effect of the survival
judgment task would only occur when participants conduct an
adequate level of elaboration. The difference between the func-
tional hypothesis and the combination hypothesis is whether to
emphasize the elaboration process. The combination hypothesis
emphasized the importance of the elaboration process to explain
the memory enhancement of the survival judgment task.
PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY AND PREDICTION OF RESULTS
Although previous studies using the survival judgment task have
provided strong evidence that the survival judgment task can
improve memory performance (Kang et al., 2008; Nairne et al.,
2008, 2009;Weinstein et al., 2008;Otgaar and Smeets, 2010;Otgaar
et al., 2010; Nouchi, 2011a,b), all previous studies used only nor-
mal healthy participants. It remains unclear whether memory
enhancement related to the survival judgment task occurs also for
depressed participants, or not. Therefore, this study was designed
to investigate exactly that question. The answer is critical for assess-
ment of the robustness of the survival judgment task beneﬁt.
Results of our study are expected to improve our understanding
of the mechanism of memory enhancement related to the survival
judgment task.
Based on previous ﬁndings of memory enhancement related to
the survival judgment task (Kang et al., 2008; Nairne et al., 2008,
2009;Weinstein et al., 2008;Otgaar and Smeets, 2010;Otgaar et al.,
2010; Nouchi, 2011a,b) and results of previous studies of effec-
tive memory strategies for depressed participants (Breslow et al.,
1981; Derry and Kuiper, 1981; Kuiper and Derry, 1982; Wein-
gartner et al., 1981, 1982), we made two predictions. First, we
predicted that the memory performance related to the survival
judgment task in both non-depressed and depressed participants
is higher than the memory performance on other tasks because
information related to survival situations is expected to be impor-
tant to humans independently of depressed conditions, because
our memory system is expected to be tuned to adaptation (Klein
et al., 2002; Nairne, 2005), and because memory enhancement
related to the survival judgment task is expected to be a robust
phenomenon (Nairne and Pandeirada, 2010). Secondly, we antic-
ipated that the survival judgment task beneﬁt in non-depressed
participants is higher than that in depressed participants because
previous studies have shown that an effective encoding strategy
improvedmemory performance in depressed participants, but the
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memory performance of effective encoding strategy in depressed
participants was actually lower than that in non-depressed partic-
ipants (Breslow et al., 1981; Derry and Kuiper, 1981; Kuiper and
Derry, 1982; Weingartner et al., 1981, 1982).
To investigate thememory beneﬁt of the survival judgment task
in depressed participants,we could also test whether the functional
hypothesis or the combination hypothesis can account for the
memory enhancement of the survival judgment task. If the func-
tional hypothesis is correct, then only the ﬁrst prediction would
be conﬁrmed. Because information about survival situations are
important to humans independently of depressed mood, mem-
ory enhancement of the survival judgment task would occur in
both depressed and non-depressed participants and there would
be no differences of the beneﬁt of the survival judgment tasks
between depressed participants and non-depressed participants.
If the combination hypothesis is correct, then both the ﬁrst and
second prediction would be conﬁrmed. The reasons are that (1)
the beneﬁt of the survival judgment task was affected by the degree
of elaboration process (Nouchi, 2011a,b) and (2) depressed people
were unable to performelaborationprocess of a certain kind (Bres-
low et al., 1981; Derry and Kuiper, 1981; Weingartner et al., 1981,
1982; Kuiper and Derry, 1982). Thus, the memory enhancement
of the survival judgment task would occur in both depressed and
non-depressed participants and the beneﬁt of the survival judg-
ment task in non-depressed participants would be higher than that
in depressed participants.
This study would have some merits for both research ﬁelds
of the memory enhancement of the survival judgment task and
memory deﬁcits in depression. First,we could examine the robust-
ness of the memory enhancement of the survival judgment task.
Second, we could test the explanatory hypotheses for the ben-
eﬁts of the survival judgment task. Third, we would give some
implications about memory deﬁcits in depressed people. Thus, we
investigated whether or not thememory enhancements of the sur-
vival judgment task elicits using the subclinical depressed people.
We discussed these issues in the discussion part.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN
From the Tohoku University community, 114 undergraduate stu-
dents (56 men, 58 women) were recruited and paid for their
participation. One or two weeks before conducting an experiment
(Time1), the 114 university students completed the Japanese ver-
sion of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Kojima et al., 2002),
which is a 21-item self-report measure of depression. Based on
results of previous studies (Hertel and Hardin, 1990; Ramponi
et al., 2009), those who received a score of 10 or higher on the BDI
were classiﬁed as subclinically depressed participants; those with
the BDI scores of 9 or lower were regarded as non-depressed par-
ticipants. This criterion was based on the BDI manual (Beck and
Beamesderfer, 1974; Kendall et al., 1987). Many previous studies
used the same criterion (e.g., Hertel and Hardin, 1990; Ramponi
et al., 2009, 2010). A lower cutoff is appropriate when the aim is to
maximize the detection of depression (Brantley et al., 2000). Next,
we contacted these participants by e-mail or phone and asked
these participants whether or not they could participate in our
experiment. Finally, 44 participants participated in the study (20
depressed participants and 24 non-depressed participants). The
44 participants answered the BDI again on the day of the experi-
ment (Time 2). A correlation of the BDI score between Time1 and
Time2 was 0.92. Table 1 presents the proﬁles of the two groups.
IQ was assessed using the Japanese Adult Reading Test – 25 word
version (JART-25;Matsuoka et al., 2006). JART-25 is a reading test
consisting of 25 Kanji compound words (e.g., , ). In this
test, participants were asked to read each Kanji compound word
aloud. This task assesses reading ability and IQ. The two groups
were matched for age and the JART score. All participants denied
past diagnosis or treatment of any neurological or psychiatric
disorder. Participantswere informedabout relevant ethical consid-
erations before entering the study, and written informed consent
was obtained from each. The protocol of this study and informed
consent procedures were approved by the Ethics Committee of
the Tohoku University Graduate School of Medicine. This study
was conducted in accordance with the ethical code of the Japan-
ese Psychological Society. The mean age of these participants was
20.37 years (SD= 1.60).
A 2 (depression: non-depressed mood and subclinical
depressed mood)× 2 (task: survival and autobiographical) fac-
tor design was used. The ﬁrst factor was between-subjects design.
The second factor was within-subjects design.
MATERIAL
From a list of Japanese nouns (Ogawa and Inamura, 1974), 36
nouns were selected. The nouns were written in two Chinese char-
acters. The imagery values (7 points scale; from 1: very low to 7:
very high) and the concreteness values (7 points scale; from 1: very
low to 7: very high) of thesewordswere both greater than 5.0. Thus,
our materials had high imagery and concreteness values. The 36
words were divided into two lists of 18 words (list A and list B;
see Table A1 in Appendix). These lists had equivalent imagery (list
A= 6.11, list B= 6.11), concreteness (list A= 6.07, list B= 6.19),
meaningfulness (list A= 3.93, list B= 4.05; 7 points scale; from
1: very low to 7: very high), and ease of learning (list A= 4.72,
list B= 4.79; 7 points scale; from 1: very difﬁcult to 7: very easy).
Half of the participants were presented with list A for the survival
Table 1 | Mean participant characteristics.
Non-depressed
participants
Depressed
participants
Effect
size (d )
p-value
(11M/13F) (9M/11F)
Mean SD Mean SD
Age (year) 20.88 0.95 20.55 1.05 0.33 0.90
JART (score) 20.13 3.49 20.00 3.28 0.04 0.66
BDI Time1 (score) 3.25 2.11 15.65 2.03 5.97 0.00
BDI Time2 (score) 3 1.84 14.8 2.61 5.32 0.00
M, Male; F, Female; SD, standard deviation; JART, Japanese Adult ReadingTest –
25; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory, BDI was measured 1 or 2weeks before
conducting the experiment (BDI Time1) and on the day of the experiment (BDI
Time2).
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judgment task and list B for the autobiographical recall task; the
other half were presentedwith list A for the autobiographical recall
task and list B for the survival judgment task.
ORIENTATION TASKS AND INSTRUCTIONS
We used the survival judgment task and the autobiographical
recall task at an encoding phase. There were some reasons why
we selected the autobiographical recall task. Firstly,many previous
studies used the autobiographical recall task as a comparative task
(e.g., Nairne et al., 2007; Nouchi, 2011a,b). Secondly, the autobio-
graphical recall taskwas one of effective encoding task (e.g.,Rogers
et al., 1977). Thirdly, we would like to avoid to any confusion in
conducting the encoding tasks, because we used a within-subject
design and trials of the survival judgment task and the autobi-
ographical recall task were presented in a random order. These
procedures might confuse participant to conduct the encoding
task if we used similar tasks (e.g., survival and moving judgment
task). Thus, we selected the survival judgment and the autobio-
graphical recall tasks. These tasks resembled those explained by
Nouchi (2011a). Participants were told the following scenarios.
In the survival judgment task, they were told, “We would like
you to imagine that you are stranded in the grasslands of a foreign
land, with no basic survival materials. Over the next few months,
you’ll need to ﬁnd steady supplies of food and water and protect
yourself from predators. We are going to show you a list of words.
Then we would like you to rate how relevant each word would be
for you in this survival situation. Some words might be relevant
and others might not be – it’s up to you to decide.” The partic-
ipants rated these words using a ﬁve-point scale ranging from 1
(completely irrelevant) to 5 (extremely relevant).
In the autobiographical recall task, they were told, “We would
like you to think of personal experiences you have had in your
life. We will present you with a series of words, and for each word
we would like you to rate how easily the word brings to mind
an important personal experience.” The participants rated these
words using a ﬁve-point scale ranging from 1 (very difﬁcult) to 5
(very easy).
PROCEDURES
This experiment was in an incidental memory situation. It was
conducted in an experimental room. Participants were told a cover
story explaining that the aim of this study was to investigate lan-
guage ability. First, participants signed an informed consent form.
Then participants were given instructions for the survival judg-
ment task and autobiographical recall task. After the instructions,
they practiced these judgment tasks three times. Then participants
performed both the survival judgment task and the autobio-
graphical recall task. Each trial began with the presentation of
instructions (survival or self) for 1.5 s in the center of a screen,
followed by a ﬁxation cross for 1 s in the center of the screen;
then stimulus for 4 s in the center of the screen. Participants were
asked to rate the stimulus by pressing the keyboard. The sizes of
instructions and stimulus were about 20mm× 20mmper charac-
ter on the display. In all, 36 words were presented, with 18 nouns
assigned to each of the two judgment tasks (survival and autobi-
ographical). Two counterbalanced orderings enabled assignment
of the words to each condition across participants. Trials of the
survival judgment task and the autobiographical recall task were
presented in a random order that was unique for each participant.
After participants judged all of 36 words, participants performed
a ﬁller task. They were asked to perform simple mathematical cal-
culations for 2min. After the ﬁller task, participants were asked
to write down as many words as they could remember from 36
words presented under the survival judgment task and the auto-
biographical recall tasks in the encoding phase. Five minutes were
given for this recall task. Finally, participants were asked to rate
arousal and emotional valence of the survival judgment task and
the autobiographical recall task. Participants rated the tasks using
a nine-point scale (for arousal scale, 1= excited and 9= calm; for
emotional valence scale, 1= happy and 9= sad). Participants were
instructed to “please rate your feeling during you have conducted
the survival judgment tasks and the autobiographical recall task.”
We collected ratings of arousal and emotional valence in the sur-
vival judgment task. The autobiographical recall task was used to
examine whether differences of ratings of these tasks would affect
memory enhancement related to the survival judgment task or
not. Some earlier results of studies suggested that the difference of
the arousal rating might enhance the memory performance of the
survival judgment task.
RESULTS
MEMORY PERFORMANCE
The means of the proportions of recall are presented in Table 2.
The proportion of recall was analyzed using a 2 (depressed mood:
non-depressed and depressed)× 2 (task: survival and autobio-
graphical) mixed ANOVA with depressed mood as the between-
subjects factor and task as the within-subjects factor. The analysis
revealed the main effect of depressed mood, F(1, 42)= 24.56,
η2p = 0.37, p< 0.001, the main effect of task, F(1, 42)= 172.43,
η2p = 0.80, p< 0.001, and the signiﬁcant interaction for depressed
mood× task, F(1, 42)= 4.20, η2p = 0.09, p< 0.05. The test of sim-
ple main effects of interaction for depressed mood× task showed
that the non-depressed participants better recalled those words
judged in both the survival judgment task and autobiographical
recall task than the depressed participants did, F(1, 42)= 24.40,
η2p = 0.37, p< 0.001, and F(1, 42)= 6.21, η2p = 0.13, p< 0.05.
These results suggest that the memory performance of the non-
depressed participants was better than that of the depressed partic-
ipants. The non-depressed participants better recalled those words
judged in the survival situation than the words judged in the auto-
biographical recall task, F(1, 23)= 155.11, η2p = 0.87, p< 0.001.
Moreover, the depressed participants better recalled those words
judged in the survival situation than the words judged in the auto-
biographical recall task, F(1, 23)= 46.08, η2p = 0.71, p< 0.001.
These results revealed that the survival judgment task beneﬁt
occurred in both non-depression participants and depression
participants.
We also conducted Pearson’s correlation analyses between the
proportions of recall and the BDI scores in each task. The result
showed that the correlation between the proportions of recall in
the survival judgment task and the BDI scores was −0.57 and
the correlation between the proportions of recall in the autobio-
graphical recall task and the BDI scores was −0.35. These results
showed that depressedmood reducedmemory performance in the
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Table 2 | Mean proportion of recall, reaction times and ratings score in non-depressed and depressed participants.
Task Proportion recall Reaction times (ms) Rating score Arousal score Emotional valence score
Survival Auto Survival Auto Survival Auto Survival Auto Survival Auto
Non-depressed participants M 0.61 0.35 2017.79 1962.86 3.70 3.93 5.46 5.73 4.97 5.19
SD 0.08 0.08 308.41 319.73 0.93 1.02 1.44 1.44 1.49 1.29
Depressed participants M 0.48 0.29 2013.89 2019.80 3.72 3.95 5.45 5.17 5.08 5.25
SD 0.09 0.08 273.76 310.18 0.86 0.95 1.11 1.25 1.37 1.27
Survival, survival judgment task; Auto, autobiographical recall task; M, mean; SD, standard deviation.
survival judgment and autobiographical recall tasks. These results
indicated that a degree of depressed mood was related to memory
performance.
ENHANCED SCORE OF THE SURVIVAL JUDGMENT TASK
We simply calculated the enhanced score of the survival judg-
ment task (thememory performance of the survival judgment task
minus the memory performance of the autobiographical recall
task). In that calculation, we used the memory performance of
the autobiographical recall task to represent the baseline perfor-
mance (Nouchi, 2011a,b). Because the memory performance of
the autobiographical recall task was different between the non-
depressed participants and the depressed participants, we con-
ducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) for the enhanced
scores. The enhanced scores were the dependent variable; groups
(non-depressed, depressed) constituted the independent variable.
The memory performance of the autobiographical recall task was
the covariate to exclude the possibility that the difference in the
memory performance of autobiographical recall task (baseline
performance) between groups affected the result. The ANCOVA
results showed that the enhanced score of the non-depressed
participants (M = 0.26, SD= 0.10) was higher than that of the
depressed participants (M = 0.18, SD= 0.12), F(1, 41)= 16.51,
η2p = 0.45, p< 0.001. The result suggested that memory enhance-
ment related to the survival judgment task in the non-depressed
participants was higher than that in the depressed participants.
Based on previous studies that investigated the effects of rating
scores on memory enhancement related to the survival judg-
ment task (Kroneisen and Erdfelder, 2011), we analyzed corre-
lations between rating scores and memory performance in all
four conditions (non-depression – survival, depression – survival,
non-depression – autobiographical, and depression – autobio-
graphical). We found no signiﬁcant correlation in any condition:
non-depression – survival (r =−0.12, n.s.), depression – survival
(r =−0.13, n.s.), non-depression – autobiographical (r =−0.15,
n.s.), and depression – autobiographical (r =−0.14, n.s.).
RATINGS AND REACTION TIMES
We analyzed the rating scores and reaction times under the sur-
vival judgment and the autobiographical recall tasks. Table 2
presents the mean ratings score and the mean reaction times.
Rating scores were analyzed using a 2 (depressed mood: non-
depressed and depressed)× 2 (task: survival and autobiograph-
ical) mixed ANOVAwith depressed mood as the between-subjects
factor and task as the within-subjects factor. Results showed no
signiﬁcant differences for the main effect of depressed mood,
F(1, 42)= 0.02, η2p = 0.00, n.s., for the main effect of task, F(1,
42)= 1.44, η2p = 0.01, n.s., or for the signiﬁcant interaction for
depressed mood× task, F(1, 42)= 0.00, η2p = 0.00, n.s.
Reaction times were also analyzed using a 2 (depressed mood:
non-depressed and depressed)× 2 (task: survival and autobio-
graphical) mixed ANOVA with depressed mood as the between-
subjects factor and task as the within-subjects factor. The results
showed no signiﬁcant differences for the main effect of depressed
mood, F(1, 42)= 0.13, η2p = 0.00, n.s., for the main effect of task,
F(1, 42)= 0.19, η2p = 0.00, n.s., or for the signiﬁcant interaction
for depressed mood× task, F(1, 42)= 0.29, η2p = 0.01, n.s.
Finally, arousal and emotional valence scores for tasks were
analyzed separately using a 2 (depressed mood: non-depressed
and depressed mood)× 2 (task: survival and autobiographical)
mixed ANOVA with depressed mood as the between-subjects
factor and task as the within-subjects factor. These results
showed no signiﬁcant differences for the main effect of the
depressed mood [arousal; F(1, 42)= 0.92, η2p = 0.01, n.s., emo-
tional; F(1, 42)= 0.09, η2p = 0.00, n.s.], the main effect of the
task [arousal; F(1, 42)= 0.00, η2p = 0.00, n.s., emotional; F(1,
42)= 0.47, η2p = 0.00, n.s.], or the interaction for depressed mood
and task [arousal; F(1, 42)= 1.03, η2p = 0.01, n.s., emotional; F(1,
42)= 0.00, η2p = 0.00, n.s.].
DISCUSSION
This study was designed to examine whether or not memory
enhancement related to the survival judgment task could be
elicited in depressed participants. This study conﬁrmed our two
predictions. First, the memory performance of the survival judg-
ment task in non-depressed and depressed participants was higher
than that of the autobiographical recall task in non-depressed and
depressed participants. The ﬁrst ﬁnding can be explained by the
functional perspective. Our memory system might be tuned to
remember ﬁtness-related information (Klein et al., 2002; Nairne,
2005), then information related to survival situations would be
important for all people. For this reason, memory enhancement
related to the survival judgment task was elicited in both non-
depressed and depressed participants. The ﬁrst ﬁndings suggest
that memory enhancement related to the survival judgment task
is a robust phenomenon irrespective of a depressed mood.
Second, memory enhancement related to the survival judg-
ment task in depressed participants is expected to be lower than
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that in non-depressed participants. The second ﬁndings can be
accounted for by the elaboration perspective. Memory perfor-
mance is expected to be determined by the degree of elabora-
tion performed on the information (Anderson and Reder, 1979).
Results of previous studies have shown that the degree of elab-
oration in depressed participants was lower than that in non-
depressed participants (Breslow et al., 1981; Derry and Kuiper,
1981; Weingartner et al., 1981, 1982; Kuiper and Derry, 1982).
Moreover, some previous studies of memory enhancement related
to the survival judgment task showed that the degree of elabora-
tion process affectsmemory performance of the survival judgment
task (Kroneisen and Erdfelder, 2011;Nouchi, 2011a). For example,
Kroneisen and Erdfelder (2011) used an original survival scenario
(Nairne et al., 2007) and a short survival scenario. The differ-
ence between the original survival scenario and the short survival
scenario was the number of problems related to the survival situ-
ation. The original survival scenario includes three main survival
problems (no food, no water, and predators). However, the short
survival scenario presents a problem (no water). The original sce-
nario was expected to facilitate more elaborate processing than
the short scenario. Kroneisen and Erdfelder (2011) demonstrated
that the survival judgment task beneﬁt in the original scenario
was greater than that in the short scenario. This result suggested
that the degree of the elaboration process inﬂuences the memory
performance of the survival judgment tasks. Presumably, mem-
ory enhancement related to the survival judgment task in the
depressed participants was less than that in the non-depressed par-
ticipants because the degree of elaboration process in depressed
participants was lower than that in non-depressed participants.
The second ﬁnding suggests that memory enhancement related
to the survival judgment task is inﬂuenced by the participant’s
depressed mood.
DISCUSSION OF AN EXPLANATORY HYPOTHESIS FOR MEMORY
ENHANCEMENT RELATED TO THE SURVIVAL JUDGMENT TASK
Our results demonstrated that (1) the survival judgment task
led to improve memory performance in both the depressed and
non-depressed participants and (2) the beneﬁt of the survival
judgment tasks in non-depressed participants was higher than
that in depressed participants. These results clearly supported
the combination hypothesis (Nouchi, 2011a,b). Some explanatory
hypotheses which explain the memory enhancement of the sur-
vival judgment task have been proposed (e.g., functional hypoth-
esis, congruent hypothesis, emotional and arousal hypothesis,
combination hypothesis). In the next section, we consider which
explanation hypothesis can explain memory enhancement related
to the survival judgment task.
The functional hypothesis
The survival judgment task beneﬁt was interpreted mainly by the
functional hypothesis, which has an evolutional perspective of
memory (Nairne et al., 2007). Evolutionary psychologists (Tooby
and Cosmides, 1992, 2005) have proposed that our cognitive
processes have been shaped by adaptation. Following that reason-
ing, the functional perspective assumed that our memory systems
are biased or tuned to remember ﬁtness (survival)-related infor-
mation (Klein et al., 2002; Nairne, 2005). In the survival judgment
task, participants were asked to think about or imagine a survival
situation and then judge whether or not the presented informa-
tion would be useful in the survival situation. Thinking about a
survival situation and judging the presented information would
improve their probability of survival. Therefore, memory per-
formance in the survival judgment task is higher than that in
other tasks (e.g., pleasantness judgment task, self-referent judg-
ment task, and moving judgment task). Although the functional
perspective of memory enhancement related to the survival judg-
ment task is widely accepted (Nairne and Pandeirada, 2010, 2011),
the functional perspective was unable to explain our results. Based
on the functional hypothesis, the survival judgment task bene-
ﬁt in the non-depressed participants would be equal to that in
the depressed participants because information related to survival
situations is important for survival of both non-depressed and
depressed participants. The functional hypothesis might explain
our ﬁrst prediction: that the survival judgment task beneﬁt occurs
in both depressed and non-depressed participants. However, it
would not explain our second hypothesis: that the survival judg-
ment task beneﬁt in non-depressed participants is better than that
in depressed participants.
The congruent hypothesis
A second possible explanatory hypothesis is a congruent hypoth-
esis. The congruent hypothesis is that participants would show
better memory for items which are rated with high rating scores
during encoding tasks than items which are rated with low rat-
ing scores. In the case of the survival judgment task, a high rating
score means that items are rated relevant to a survival situation.
Some items in the survival judgment taskmight be assigned higher
rating scores than in other judgment tasks; then the memory per-
formance of the survival judgment task would be better than that
of other judgment tasks. Someprevious studiesmight be explained
by the congruent hypothesis (Butler et al., 2009),but the congruent
hypothesis could not account for our result. In our study, no sig-
niﬁcant differences of the rating scores were found between those
of encoding tasks (survival and self-judgment tasks) and groups
(non-depressed and depressed participants). Moreover, no signif-
icant differences of correlations were found between the rating
scores and memory performance in any condition. Consequently,
only the congruent hypothesis was unable to explain memory
enhancement related to the survival judgment task.
The emotional and arousal hypothesis
Thirdly, some researchers (Nairne et al., 2007; Weinstein et al.,
2008) have proposed an emotional and arousal hypothesis to
account for the survival judgment task beneﬁt. The emotional and
arousal hypothesis is based on evidence that emotion can enhance
memory performance (LaBar and Cabeza, 2006). The emotional
and arousal hypothesis implies that the survival judgment task
can evoke greater emotion and arousal than other control tasks;
for that reason, the memory performance in the survival judg-
ment task would be higher than that in other control tasks. We
investigated this possibility of analyzing arousal and emotional
valence ratings of encoding tasks (survival and self). Results show
no signiﬁcant differences between the encoding tasks in terms of
the arousal and valence emotional ratings. The same results were
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reported also by Soderstrom and McCabe (2011). For these rea-
sons, the emotional and arousal hypothesis was unable to account
for memory enhancement related to the survival judgment task.
The combination hypothesis
A ﬁnal explanatory hypothesis is a combination hypothesis.
Nouchi (2011a) recently proposed the combination hypothesis
that accounts for the survival judgment task beneﬁt. The combi-
nation hypothesis is a combination of the functional perspective
(Klein et al., 2002; Nairne, 2005) and the elaboration perspective
(Anderson and Reder, 1979). The combination hypothesis accepts
the concept of the functional perspective of memory. Evolution-
ary psychologists (Tooby andCosmides, 1992, 2005) proposed that
our cognitive processes have been shaped by adaptation. Follow-
ing that reasoning, the functional perspective assumed that our
memory systems are biased or tuned to remember ﬁtness-related
information (Klein et al., 2002; Nairne, 2005). Therefore, imag-
ining a survival situation would support better retention than
imagining other situations that are unrelated to survival (e.g.,
moving) or conducting other tasks (e.g., self, semantic, and pleas-
antness). Moreover, our memory performance can be better when
we conduct an elaboration process of some kind (Anderson and
Reder, 1979). The elaboration means the process of adding infor-
mation (e.g., a logical inference, an illustration, or a detailed
image; Gagne, 1985) to the stimulus. Memory performance is
expected to be determined by the number and type of elabora-
tion performed on the information (Anderson and Reder, 1979).
Nouchi (2011b) asserted that the number and type of elaboration
is facilitated during a participant’s consideration of whether or
not the presented items might be useful in the survival situation.
Thereby, imagining the survival situationwould engender conduct
of more elaboration processes than other encoding tasks would.
The combination hypothesis assumed that the beneﬁcial effect of
the survival judgment task would occur only when participants
conduct an adequate level of elaboration. Supporting the combi-
nation hypothesis, Kroneisen and Erdfelder (2011) reported that a
degree of elaboration affectedmemory enhancement related to the
survival judgment task. Anderson and Reder (1979) also reported
that the elaboration capability is dependent on a participant’s
experiences (aging) and abilities (e.g., imagery ability). For exam-
ple, the amount of the elaboration in elderly people was lower than
that in younger people (Eysenck, 1974; Erber et al., 1980; Daselaar
et al., 2003). Consistent with the combination hypothesis, Nouchi
(2011b) demonstrated that memory enhancement related to the
survival judgment task in elderly participants was lower than that
in younger participants. The combination hypothesis might be a
generally versatile explanation for memory enhancement related
to the survival judgment task because the combination hypothe-
sis has both adaptive and elaboration perspectives. Based on the
combination hypothesis, our results can be explained as follows.
In the survival judgment task, participants are asked to imagine
the survival situation and judge whether or not the presented
item is necessary in the survival situation. Presumably, considering
whether or not the presented items might be used in the survival
situationwould promote various elaboration processes. For exam-
ple, participants would think about the meaning of the presented
items, recall past episodes in which they used the presented items,
and imagine future episodes inwhich theywould use the presented
item in a survival situation. Consequently, compared to the autobi-
ographical recall task, the survival judgment task couldbe expected
to facilitate the elaboration process that engenders more connec-
tions between the target item and other information in memory.
Therefore, thememory performance in the survival judgment task
might be higher than that in other tasks. Additionally, the elabora-
tion process is expected to be reduced by depressedmood (Breslow
et al., 1981; Derry and Kuiper, 1981;Weingartner et al., 1981, 1982;
Kuiper andDerry,1982). For those reasons,memory enhancement
related to the survival judgment task in depressed participants is
expected to be lower than that in non-depressed participants.
We discussed the functional hypothesis, the congruent hypoth-
esis, the emotional and arousal hypothesis, and the combination
hypothesis above. The combination hypothesis could be expected
to expound memory enhancement related to the survival judg-
ment task sufﬁciently compared to the other hypotheses.Hypothe-
ses of memory enhancement related to the survival judgment
tasks have emphasized either a basic perspective of memory or a
functional perspective of memory. The basic perspective of mem-
ory can explain phenomena related to memory such as memory
enhancement related to the survival judgment task using basic
memory principles (e.g., elaboration or arousal). The functional
perspective of memory assumes that our memory is shaped and
that it evolved because it improves the probability of survival
either directly or indirectly (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992, 2005;
Nairne, 2005). For instance, the congruent hypothesis (Butler
et al., 2009) and the emotional and arousal hypothesis (Nairne
et al., 2007; Weinstein et al., 2008) are based on the basic perspec-
tive of memory. However, the functional hypothesis speciﬁcally
examines functions of memory (Nairne et al., 2007). The com-
bination hypothesis has the basic perspective (elaboration) of
memory and the functional perspective of memory. Therefore,
the combination hypothesis can explain memory enhancement
related to the survival judgment task better than other hypotheses.
Presumably, memory researchers would consider memory phe-
nomena using the basic and functional perspectives. Memory
enhancement related to the survival judgment task can serve as
a starting point for thinking about the basic and the functional
perspectives of memory. The experimental paradigm of the sur-
vival judgment task is basic, including concepts such as paradigms
of levels of processing (Craik and Tulving, 1975) and self-referent
tasks (Rogers et al., 1977). Therefore, many memory researchers
can easily start to investigate memory enhancement related to the
survival judgment task.
FUTURE STUDIES AND LIMITATIONS
Although our study showed that memory enhancement related to
the survival judgment tasks can be elicited independently of the
depressed emotion, some questions remain unanswered. First, it
remains unclear whether or not memory enhancement related to
the survival judgment task would occur in other negative (e.g.,
anxiety) or positive (e.g., happy) emotional states. Second, it
is important to examine whether or not an emotional valence
of stimulus (e.g., positive emotional stimulus or negative emo-
tional stimulus) can affect memory enhancement related to the
survival judgment task in depressed people. Although depressed
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people tend to recall negative emotional stimuli compared to
positive emotional stimuli (Bradley and Mathews, 1988; Ramel
et al., 2007), the effects of the emotional valence on memory
enhancement related to the survival judgment task remain unclear
in depressed people. Further research is necessary to test the
effect of emotional states and emotional valence of stimulus on
memory enhancement related to the survival judgment task. Our
results should be regarded as ﬁrst steps toward understanding the
effect of emotion on memory enhancement related to the survival
judgment task.
Our methods in this study had some limitations. A ﬁrst limita-
tion is a classiﬁcation of participants. To divide participants into
depressed participants and non-depressed participants, we used
the 9/10 cutoff score on the BDI. The reasons why we used this
cutoff score were that (1) previous studies in memory research
ﬁelds used this 9/10 cutoff score (e.g., Hertel and Hardin, 1990;
Ramponi et al., 2009, 2010) and (2) Beck who developed the BDI
recommended to use 9/10 cutoff score (Beck and Beamesderfer,
1974). Although the 9/10 cutoff score is one of standard meth-
ods in the BDI, using a cutoff score method have a limitation.
If there are a participant scoring 9 on the BDI and a participant
scoring 10 on the BDI, the participant scoring 9 would be allo-
cated to a non-depressed participants group and the participants
scoring 10 would be allocated to a depressed participants group
even if the difference of the participants is only one point dif-
ference on the BDI. Further research should combine use of the
BDI and other depression measures to divide participants into
depressed or non-depressed participants groups. A second lim-
itation is a method to measure arousal and emotional valences.
We asked participants to rate arousal and emotional valences of
the two encoding tasks. This method only measured the overall
ratings of arousal and emotional valences for two tasks. There is a
possibility that arousal and emotion valences on eachword or item
might affect the memory enhancement of the survival judgment
task. Presumably, a superior method would be that participants
rate the arousal and emotion valence of all presented words after
the experiment. Further study should use a better method which
could investigate the effects of arousal and emotional valence of
the item level on the memory enhancement of the survival judg-
ment task. Finally, we examined subclinically depressed partici-
pants. It remains unclear whether memory enhancement related
to the survival judgment task would occur in clinically depressed
participants. Future studies should examine clinically depressed
participants.
IMPLICATIONS FOR MEMORY DEFICITS IN DEPRESSED PEOPLE
Memory deﬁcits in depressed people are one of main cognitive
impairments in depressed people (e.g., Burt et al., 1995). The
memory deﬁcits could be explained by the initiative deﬁcit model
(Hertel and Hardin, 1990; Hertel, 1994, 1998) or the resource allo-
cation model (Ellis and Ashbrook, 1988; Ellis et al., 1997). The
initiative deﬁcit model (Hertel and Hardin, 1990; Hertel, 1994,
1998) hypothesized that depressed mood would reduce the initia-
tive to use beneﬁcial strategies in memory tasks. Thus, memory
performance in depressed participants would be lower than that
in non-depressed participants. On the other hand, the resource
allocation model (Ellis and Ashbrook, 1988; Ellis et al., 1997)
explains memory deﬁcits by limited cognitive capacities. In this
model, depressed people would have tendencies to focus on irrel-
evant task features or to think more about their own mood states.
Because these tendencies may lead to reduce cognitive capacities
in depressed people, memory performance in depressed people
would be lower than that in non-depressed people.
Our results showed that memory performance in depressed
participants was lower than that in non-depressed participants,
even if depressed participants used effective encoding strategies or
tasks (survival judgment and autobiographical recall tasks). This
result supported the resource allocation model. Memory deﬁcits
in depressed people could be explained as follows. Presumably,
depressed people may be disturbed by irrelevant thoughts (e.g.,
focusing on irrelevant task features) during conducting effec-
tive encoding tasks (survival judgment or autobiographical recall
tasks). Because cognitive capacities in depressed people would be
limited by these irrelevant thoughts, they could not conduct an
elaboration process of a certain type (Williams et al., 1997). There-
fore, memory performance in depressed people would be lower
compared to non-depressed people.
Based on the resource allocation model, it would be impor-
tant to reduce task irrelevant thoughts as well as to use effective
encoding strategies for improvement of memory performance in
depressed people. For example, Hertel and Rude (1991) showed
that focused attention and inhibition of task irrelevant thoughts
could improvememory performance in depressed people. In order
to improve memory performance in depressed people, both using
effective encoding strategies and reducing task irrelevant thoughts
may be necessary. Further studies which use both approaches
to reduce task irrelevant thoughts and to use effective encoding
strategies should be needed in order to clarify the mechanism
of memory deﬁcits in depression and to propose techniques to
improve memory performance in depressed people.
CONCLUSION
In summary, our study was the ﬁrst to show evidence of memory
enhancement related to the survival judgment task in depressed
participants. This result reﬂects thatmemory enhancement related
to the survival judgment task is a robust phenomenon. More-
over, our results showed that depressed mood reduced memory
enhancement related to the survival judgment task. These results
supported the combination hypothesis which explained the ben-
eﬁts of survival judgment tasks (Nouchi, 2011a,b). The combi-
nation hypotheses assumed that elaboration process would be
important to elicit the memory enhancement of the survival judg-
ment task. The survival judgment tasks would facilitate to conduct
elaboration processes. Therefore,memory performance of the sur-
vival judgment taskwashigher thanmemoryperformanceof other
encoding tasks regardless of depressedmood.However, a degree of
elaboration in depressed participants was lower than that in non-
depressed participants (Breslow et al., 1981; Derry and Kuiper,
1981; Weingartner et al., 1981, 1982; Kuiper and Derry, 1982).
Thus, the memory enhancement of the survival judgment tasks
in depressed participants was lower compared to non-depressed
participants. Our ﬁndings may suggest that elaboration process-
ing would be a key concept to understand the mechanism of the
memory enhancement of the survival judgment task.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 | Stimuli used for our experiment.
List A English I C M E List B English I C M E
仏 像 Buddha statue 6.33 5.53 4.20 3.83 新 聞 Newspaper 6.43 6.37 4.40 5.30
公 園 Park 6.60 6.13 5.07 5.40 免 許 License 5.83 5.90 3.23 4.53
睡 眠 Sleep 5.83 5.40 3.87 4.13 葉 巻 Cigar 5.83 6.40 4.33 3.53
写 真 Photo 6.33 6.27 3.67 5.43 石 油 Oil 5.80 6.33 4.67 5.40
電 池 Battery 6.43 6.63 3.17 4.70 炭 鉱 Coal mine 5.47 6.07 4.37 3.50
人 形 Doll 5.83 6.50 4.30 5.97 手 紙 Letter 6.43 6.27 4.30 5.80
便 所 Toilet 6.47 6.63 3.30 4.87 試 験 Test 6.30 5.50 4.10 4.50
砂 糖 Sugar 6.30 6.67 4.97 5.10 帽 子 Hat 6.33 6.60 3.80 4.47
学 校 School 6.40 5.73 3.97 5.73 建 物 Building 5.87 5.83 3.57 4.87
肥 料 Fertilizer 5.13 5.83 3.33 3.80 小 説 Novel 5.87 5.90 3.40 5.40
道 路 Road 6.23 6.40 4.43 5.57 宝 石 Gem 5.97 5.77 4.03 5.60
植 物 Plant 5.93 5.10 5.00 4.83 並 木 Colonnade 6.00 6.17 5.20 5.30
映 画 Movie 6.37 5.83 3.60 5.50 時 計 Clock 6.43 6.40 4.27 5.73
劇 場 Theater 6.30 5.87 3.80 4.77 切 手 Stamp 6.70 6.57 3.47 5.40
冷 水 Cold water 5.47 6.30 3.83 4.20 戸 棚 Cupboard 6.03 6.77 3.33 3.67
玄 関 Entrance 6.10 6.13 3.37 3.93 太 陽 Sun 6.47 6.43 4.67 5.87
警 察 Police 6.33 6.20 3.53 4.43 果 樹 Fruit tree 5.97 5.73 4.27 3.50
編 物 Knitting 5.60 6.13 3.80 2.70 階 段 Stairs 6.30 6.43 3.47 3.80
Average 6.11 6.07 3.94 4.72 Average 6.11 6.19 4.05 4.79
I, imagery; C, concreteness; M, meaningfulness; E, ease of learning.
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